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Scientists often misunderstand the role science plays and should play in policy making. Those 
misconceptions are captured well in the debate over whether Congress should recreate an Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA).In a classic children’s story, The Enormous 
Egg, published in the U.S. in 1956, a scien-
tist laments, in a tone of dismay and won-
der, that he can understand complicated 
scientific ideas, but he can’t understand 
Congress. Although the scenario in the 
book is fictional—Congress wants to kill a 
dinosaur that is costing too much to feed 
at the National Zoo—the concern is all too 
real, and it’s heard at least as often today 
as it was a half-century ago.
“Why would Congress limit stem cell 
research?” many scientists ask. “How 
could Congress reject or ignore the sci-
ence that indicates the climate is chang-
ing?” “Does Congress simply lack the 
most basic scientific information?” And 
these sorts of head-scratching ques-
tions are often followed, with exaspera-
tion, by, “Why did Congress eliminate its 
in-house Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA), and shouldn’t it bring it back 
immediately?”
Congress created OTA in 1972 to pre-
pare reports that would help Congress 
understand the technical background 
needed to act on issues related to sci-
ence and technology and that would lay 
out several possible policy options to 
address such issues. The reports gen-
erally had to be requested by a mem-
ber of Congress. OTA got set up just as 
the size of the Congressional staff was 
beginning to grow and Congress was 
looking to strengthen its own sources 
of information and expertise to counter 
that of the President and his appoin-
tees in the Executive Branch. Congress 
shut down OTA in 1995 in one of its first 
acts after the Republican Party recap-
tured control of the institution for the 
first time in 40 years. The Republicans 
described the elimination of OTA as a 
cost-cutting measure, and that was a large part of the motivation, but OTA 
was also seen by some as a bastion of 
liberalism.
Since its demise, OTA has taken on 
a symbolic, even mythical, importance 
that far outstrips any role it played while 
it was in existence. OTA did excellent 
work, and many of its reports can still 
serve as valuable reference material. 
(The Federation of American Scientists, 
for example, maintains an archive of OTA 
reports at http://www.fas.org/ota.) But 
the reports rarely played a pivotal role in 
decision-making and, like many reports, 
they were sometimes requested by Sen-
ators or Congressmen who already knew 
what they wanted to do and just were 
looking for some experts to back them 
up. Yet the story scientists often tell now 
is, in effect, that Congressional decisions 
went off track after OTA was abolished 
because members lacked the facts they 
needed to make the right choices.
This line of thinking is very seductive—
it identifies a single cause for complex 
change and puts science at the center of 
the story—but it is based on fundamen-
tal misunderstandings about both poli-
tics and policy. First, OTA was abolished 
because American politics took on a more 
conservative cast; politics did not change 
because OTA was abolished. But more 
important, scientific results and other 
technical information are, and should be, 
only one factor in making policy decisions. 
And technical information rarely points to 
only a single policy option—even in cases 
where the majority of scientists favor one 
particular policy. Scientists are too often 
inclined to believe that “if you knew what I 
know, you’d think like I think.”
The debate over stem cell research 
is a case in point. That debate turns 
primarily on ethical questions, and no Cell 139, Namount of scientific information is going 
to, or should, determine whether one 
believes that stem cell research should 
go forward. Opposing stem cell research 
does not mean one is anti-science even 
if it does mean one is disagreeing with 
most scientists. (I say this as a supporter 
of stem cell research.)
An OTA study on stem cell research 
could have been helpful in examining 
the potential benefits of various types 
of stem cell research, in clarifying how 
many cell lines were available, in laying 
out a range of ways stem cell research 
could be regulated, even in surveying the 
ethical debate. But an OTA study would 
not have been able to dictate what the 
“scientific” answer to the stem cell quan-
dary was because no such answer exists. 
Therefore, a study would not have sig-
nificantly altered the Congressional vote 
on the issue. The vote changed when the 
public elected a Congress with different 
values, not different science.
This tendency to conflate scientific 
questions (i.e., questions related to 
the natural and physical sciences) with 
questions of values, policy, or econom-
ics is a perennial problem, and it afflicts 
almost every regulatory discussion, not 
just ones as emotionally charged as the 
conflict over stem cell research. Fights 
over whether to regulate a pollutant, for 
example, are usually framed as debates 
over the reliability of scientific findings, 
but often the actual disagreement is over 
the values question of how much risk is 
acceptable for society or whether reduc-
ing emissions is worth the cost.
This tendency (sometimes conscious, 
sometimes not) to confuse scientific and 
values debates may be getting worse 
because in a highly polarized political 
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that their position on an issue is the 
“scientific” one, and therefore somehow 
beyond dispute. (Note that this attitude, 
although often not healthy for science, is 
based on respect for it.) An OTA study (or 
any other study) on a regulatory matter 
that helped separate scientific quarrels 
from differences that arise from other 
causes might be helpful for clarifying the 
debate, but it would not settle an issue. 
The values questions would remain the 
critical determinant.
A recent report from the Bipartisan Pol-
icy Center, “Improving the Use of Science in 
Regulatory Policy,” brings home this point 
and recommends that federal agencies be 
required to distinguish between science 
and policy questions when they propose 
regulations (http://www.bipartisanpolicy.
org/projects/science-policy). The report 
was written by a broad, bipartisan group 
that included both officials who served 
under President George W. Bush and their 
antagonists. (I directed the study.)
None of this is to say that members of 
Congress and their staffs always under-
stand or accept scientific findings. The 
clearest case of a refusal to make peace 
with the science has been the debate 
over global climate change, although 
this has been gradually improving (and 
not solely because new members have 
been elected). The climate change 
debate is somehow seen as typifying the 
way politicians deal with science, but it 
is actually exceptional in every respect. 
It’s rare that politicians debate a purely 
scientific question (i.e., are human activi-
ties changing the earth’s climate?); it’s 
rare that scientists can offer a clear (and 
codified) consensus view on a matter 
with policy implications; and it’s rare that 
politicians ignore or quarrel with that 
consensus for a prolonged period.648 Cell 139, November 13, 2009 ©2009 ElsBut the problem has hardly been the 
unavailability of information. Reports by 
the Nobel prize-winning Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change, the National 
Academy of Sciences, and many other 
credible groups have been widely cir-
culated and briefed on Capitol Hill. The 
remaining in-house research arms of the 
Congress, such as the Library of Con-
gress’ Congressional Research Service, 
have put out papers summarizing the 
science. The addition of a study or two 
or three from OTA would not have made 
any difference on the overall debate 
whatsoever.
Studies, though, have had an impact on 
aspects of the climate debate, even while 
Republicans controlled the Congress. 
A Congressionally-requested National 
Academy of Sciences study in 2006, for 
example, quieted political attacks on the 
so-called “hockey stick graph,” an effort 
to create a thousand-year temperature 
record that showed recent decades to 
be abnormally warm. And a study on the 
climate impact of biofuels, just published 
in Science in October, is igniting a dis-
cussion on how climate legislation should 
account for the burning of such fuels.
So, since 1995 when OTA was dis-
banded, Congress has hardly lacked for 
scientific information when it wanted it. 
That’s why the Democrats, while sup-
porting OTA in theory, have not been 
willing to spend the money to re-estab-
lish it since they regained control of the 
Congress in 2006. But starting up OTA 
again would be a good idea even though 
its impact was less far-reaching than 
is often suggested. An OTA would be 
especially helpful in matters on which 
the National Academies may be less 
suited—for example, defining prob-
lems that may be quietly brewing at the evier Inc.intersection of policy and science, or 
examining policy questions related to 
technology (as OTA’s name and original 
mandate emphasized). Such examples 
might include a study of the implica-
tions of developments in neuroscience 
and genetics for the legal understand-
ing of individual responsibility, or even 
more broadly, for our sense of what it 
means to be human. A less philosophical 
issue, and one more related to technol-
ogy, would be analyzing what factors are 
limiting the ability of the U.S. to develop 
new energy technologies and what poli-
cies might reduce or remove those bar-
riers. Neither of these are cases in which 
an OTA report would settle a dispute, but 
that was never the agency’s function to 
begin with.
It seems safe to predict, though, that 
with or without an OTA, Congress will 
continue to baffle and frustrate scientists, 
at least some of the time, just as it does 
everyone else. Congress today is beset 
by many problems—the polarization of 
American politics, the changing nature 
of the media, the need for campaign 
finance reform, the tendency to delegate 
decision-making to, rather than just hear 
out, interest groups, to name a few. But 
even in the best of times, the legislative 
process seems arcane, labyrinthine, 
confusing. There is rarely a single “right” 
answer to a problem (although answers 
can prove to be wrong), but each con-
stituent or constituency believes their 
approach is the right one.
That children’s book, The Enormous 
Egg, is really an allegory about McCa-
rthyism; science is just the plot device. 
Even in that tale, as in so many real-world 
examples, fights were only framed in 
terms of science; politics was the actual 
and legitimate subject of the battle.
